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SCREENING AND SURVEILLANCE – PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 
RJC Steele 
 
Abstract 
Health screening can only be applied to populations, not individuals. For it to be 
effective, the initial screening test must be acceptable and reasonably accurate, the 
disease must be treatable with better outcomes when treated early and the harm and 
cost associated with screening must not outweigh its benefits. Robust evidence is 
therefore required before systematic screening is implemented.  Surveillance implies 
the testing of people at high risk of disease and is therefore distinct from screening in 
both scale (smaller) and intensity (greater).  In both cases, however, clear information 
must be provided to potential participants so that they can weigh up the balance of 
benefit and harm before deciding on whether or not to engage in the process. 
 
Article 
The term “screening” derives from the practice of sieving gravel from a river bed to 
remove the majority of small particles so that larger nuggets of gold are more easily 
identified.  Thus, health screening implies testing a large number of asymptomatic 
individuals with a view to detecting a small number with early disease or risk of 
developing disease in order to improve the outcome.  It follows that only populations 
can be screened – individuals can only be tested.  Criteria for effective screening were 
set out by Wilson and Jungner in the 1960’s,1 and these are encapsulated in the 
following three statements:  
 
1. There is a screening test that is acceptable to those for whom it is intended, 
which is reasonably accurate and can be offered to large numbers of appropriate 
people. 
 
2. The disease in question is not only treatable, but, in addition, treatment of 
disease at an early stage of its development produces better outcomes than 
treating disease that presents with symptoms. 
 
3. The harm and cost associated with detecting and treating early disease by 
screening is less than the harm and cost of not screening for the disease. This 
should not be taken to mean that screening must necessarily save money, it 
implies cost-effectiveness; i.e. any improvement in quality and/or quantity of life 
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must not come at a cost that society cannot sustain both in terms of actual 
resource and physical or psychological harm created by offering screening 
 
To be absolutely sure that these principles apply to a specific disease process, 
particularly in adult screening, it is essential to carry out population based randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs) where a target population is randomly divided into two groups: 
one is actively invited for screening and the other forms an uninvited control group.  The 
outcomes from the disease are then analysed on an intention to screen basis, i.e. the 
group invited to screening must include those who have chosen not to participate and 
those who are diagnosed with the disease after a negative screening test (interval 
disease) as well as those who are screened and who may have screen-detected 
disease. The purpose of adopting this rigorous and intensive approach is to remove the 
effect of important biases that are part and parcel of the whole process of screening2.  
Perhaps the most obvious bias is lead-time; as the duration of survival from a disease 
has to be measured from the time of diagnosis, screening always appears to improve 
mortality by lengthening the interval between diagnosis and death without necessarily 
affecting the actual time that death was destined to occur.  Another important issue is 
volunteer bias; when a population is invited for screening, some, often a significant 
proportion, will not participate.  The reasons for this are various, but overall, those who 
do not participate in screening are, in general, more deprived and less healthy than 
those who do, and thus will have poorer outcomes from any disease process, including 
that being screened for. This, of course, artificially enhances the benefit of screening. 
Length bias occurs as screening tends to pick up relatively slow-growing disease.  
Finally, over-diagnosis introduces bias since screening will inevitably detect disease that 
is not destined to cause suffering or death because the lead time is so long that some of 
those diagnosed by screening will have died from other causes before the disease 
would have caused symptoms. 
Well-conducted population-based RCTs will eliminate the inherent biases, but this in 
itself is not sufficient evidence to be certain that screening should be recommended.  
Even if disease-specific mortality or morbidity is shown unequivocally to be reduced by 
screening, it is still possible for screening to cause more harm than good or require too 
much resource to be sustainable.  Thus, in addition to RCTs, careful cost-benefit 
analyses are required in order to satisfy the third principle summarised above. 
A good example of this is prostate cancer screening, where there is RCT evidence of 
mortality reduction3, but the price of preventing one prostate cancer death is treating 27 
men needlessly and causing significant morbidity.  For the reason, the UK National 
Screening Committee, which is responsible for advising the UK governments on 
screening policy4, has not recommended population screening for this disease5.  In 
breast cancer, overdiagnosis occasioned by the mammographic detection of ductal 
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carcinoma in situ (DCIS) has called breast cancer screening into question on several 
occasions6.   
There is a so called screening paradox whereby the benefits are more apparent than 
some of the downsides. Most people have a negative screening test and get the “all 
clear”.  Only a tiny proportion of the screened population will experience adverse effects 
from anxiety or treatment for disease that would not have caused any symptoms or 
harm. Most of these people will be unaware that this was the case and may even be 
grateful to the system that has “saved” them. 
It is also possible that changes in the impact of a disease may change with time; 
treatments may improve so much that the benefit of early detection is lessened, and 
prevention strategies may reduce the incidence of the disease so much that screening 
is no longer useful or viable.  An example of the latter is vaccination for HPV, which 
may, with time, make cervical screening redundant. 
It is therefore really important that new screening programmes are not initiated without 
rigorous assessment of the evidence, and that existing programme are kept under 
regular review.  By ensuring that only clinically beneficial and cost-effective screening is 
prosecuted, causing unintended harm and spending large amounts of money to no 
good effect can be minimised. 
The distinction between screening and surveillance is a grey and difficult area. In the 
end, however, it requires a pragmatic approach to ensure that, whichever label is 
attached to a process, some body takes ownership of it and adopts an evidence-based 
approach to its implementation (or not) as articulated above.  For practical purposes, 
however, screening can be defined as the process of actively approaching large 
numbers of asymptomatic people, most of whom will be free of disease, and offering 
them testing that is either diagnostic for the disease in question or that can identify a 
high-risk group that can then be offered diagnostic investigations. Responding to a need 
for testing because of a very high-risk condition (e.g. Lynch syndrome7 or BRCA8 
carriers) can be defined as surveillance as it does not involve pro-actively identifying the 
high-risk individuals from within an average risk population.  It is the remit of the UK 
NSC to advise on screening, and of other bodies, notably the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE)9, to advise on surveillance. None of this is set in 
stone, however, and it is critical to have dialogue between the responsible organisations 
to ensure that the needs of patient groups and the population as a whole are met and 
do not fall between two stools. 
Offering screening is very different from offering treatment to a symptomatic patient.  
When discussing diagnostic and treatment options for a disease, a clinician has a very 
clear duty to explain both the benefits and the potential complications of that treatment 
so that the patient can make a decision based on this information, i.e. so that they can 
make an informed choice. In responsible medical practice, this has always been true, 
although it was emphasised by the “Montgomery” ruling10, when it was clarified that 
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information given to a patient to help them come to a decision about treatment options 
should be that required by any reasonable patient rather than it being in the domain of a 
reasonable body of medical opinion.   
When screening is offered, there can be public emphasis on the virtues of participating 
despite the fact that the chances of an individual benefiting are much less than they 
would be when being treated for an established disease process.  High coverage 
uptake is important in population screening in order to make an impact on the burden of 
disease on society, and hence there is well-meaning reluctance to discuss or explain 
the possible adverse effects of participating in screening.  However, if there is a duty of 
candour for treatment, where the likelihood of benefit is high for an individual, then a 
there must be a similar duty for screening where the likelihood of benefit is lower. Thus, 
one of the main challenges in screening is to balance the need for sufficiently high 
participation rates to have a meaningful impact on the disease with the need to provide 
transparent information to people so that they can make an informed choice about 
whether or not to participate in screening. 
 
In conclusion, screening has the potential to do good, but it also does harm.  All 
stakeholders have a responsibility to ensure that screening programmes do more good 
than harm and at reasonable cost.  This requires constant re-evaluation of evidence and 
generation of new knowledge as well as vigilance relating to the quality and delivery of 
existing programmes.  Screening and surveillance are not the same, but they are 
related and it is essential that they are both based on firm evidence.  Finally, informed 
choice is a cornerstone of ethical screening and requires careful and sensitive 
communication with individuals and the population. 
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